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Response to the Law Commissions’ Consultation Paper Automated Vehicle – A regulatory 
framework for automated vehicles 
Professor Sarvapali Ramchurn,1 Professor Derek McAuley,2 Professor Gary Burnett,3 Professor 
Richard Hyde,4 Dr Jiahong Chen5 and Didier Hawkey.6 
The UKRI Trustworthy Autonomous Systems (TAS) Hub assembles a team from the Universities of 
Southampton, Nottingham, and King’s College London. The role of the TAS Hub is to coordinate and 
work with six research nodes to establish a collaborative platform for the UK to deliver world-leading 
best practices for the design, regulation and operation of ‘socially beneficial’ autonomous systems. 
The team share the vision that to realise the industrial and societal benefits of autonomous systems, 
they must be trustworthy by design, judged both through objective processes of systematic 
assurance and certification, and via the more subjective lens of users, industry, and the public. All six 
of the authors of this response are involved in the TAS Hub. Professor Ramchurn is the Director of 
the Hub; Professor McAuley is the Deputy Director of the TAS Hub; Professors Burnett and Hyde are 
Co-Investigators, Dr Chen is a Researcher; and Mr Hawkey is a member of the Doctoral Training 
Network. 
The UKRI-funded Horizon Digital Economy Research Institute centred at the University of 
Nottingham brings together an interdisciplinary team with expertise from a wide variety of 
backgrounds including computer science, engineering, mathematics, psychology, sociology, 
business, social science and the arts. The team is addressing the research challenge of how to 
promote deep personalization, whilst providing control and privacy to citizens, even as we develop 
new blended experiences that converge traditional and digital artefacts, services and media. 
Professor McAuley is a Co-Director of Horizon and Dr Chen is a Researcher.  
We welcome the Law Commissions’ consultation paper Automated Vehicle – A regulatory 
framework for automated vehicles which outlines a future regulatory framework for AVs. In 
response to the consultation questions below, we aim to provide response based on our research to 
assist the development of the regulatory regime for AVs. 
We give answers to the questions as below: 
1.  Agreed 
2.  In order to ensure that the benefits of autonomous vehicles are available to all and that 
duties under the Equality Act are satisfied, self-driving features should be designed to be 
used by people with hearing loss. It is worth noting that people with hearing impairment 
form one of the largest disability groups in the UK (almost a million people are severely 
or profoundly deaf). Providing important information in multiple modalities (I.e. 
redundancy in design) will not only be important for these individuals, but it is well 
established as a critical strategy for ALL users. In this respect, haptic and tactile cues are 
particularly important in the vehicle context. 
3.  Agreed 
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4.  (a). An automated vehicle should reach the standard a human driver as set out in 
Nettleship v Weston. This will ensure that other road users and pedestrians do not have 
differential expectations of the standard of safety expected from automated and human 
driven cars. 
 
5.  No response 
6.  As part of the approval process the regulator should conduct an equality impact 
assessment and provide opportunities for comments (in so far as this is permitted by 
commercial confidentiality concerns) 
7.  No response 
8.  Yes 
9.  Yes 
10.  Yes 
11.  Agreed 
12.  If the appeal process under regulation 19 is to be used it must be ensured that the panel 
are sufficiently expert in automated driving systems to deal with the appeal. 
13.  Agreed 
14.  Agreed 
15.  Yes 
16.  Yes 
17.  No response 
18.  Agreed 
19.  The powers should apply to cybersecurity. At the moment AVs fall within the definition 
of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) under the ITS Directive but the associated 
cybersecurity issues are not subject to the Network and Information Systems (NIS) 
Regulations 2018, as the scope of an essential service in the road transport sector under 
the Regulations covers only road authorities (see Paragraph 7 Schedule 2). Given the 
seriousness of the ramifications of a cyberattack targeting AVs, it should be reviewed 
whether there is a need to expand the scope to also cover the key service providers in 
the AV sector. 
20.  In order to ensure expertise it may be best to combine the functions in a single body. 
 
21.  There should be a duty to consult with interested parties; there should be a clear 
mechanism that ensures that consultation is possible, subject to concerns about 
commercial confidentiality. 
 
22.  Agreed. Investigations should not necessarily be limited to situations that lead to 
adverse consequences. Near miss investigations should be routinised.  
23.  Agreed 
24.  Agreed. Consideration should be given to whether monetary penalties should be linked 
to turnover, similarly to the GDPR.  
25.  Agreed. This will allow expertise to be develop 
26.  Agreed 
27.  No response 
28.  Agreed 
29.  Agreed 
30.  No. In such circumstances the driving instructor should be the user in charge, but 
following the end of the transition demand period the learner driver should acquire the 
legal obligations of the driver. 
31.  Agreed. We would suggest that unfitness and lack of qualification be separate offences 
and that different pathways of unfitness (e.g. unfitness through drink; unfitness through 
drugs) be defined. 
32.  Agreed 
33.  No response 
34.  Agreed 
35.  Agreed, subject to such software updates not significantly changing the underlying 
personal data collection and processing that in essence the users has consented to at 
purchase. 
36.  Agreed 
37.  The definition should be amended to cover remote operation. This definition needs to 
be very clear to explain what ‘remote’ means, and what ‘operation’ means in this 
context. There are many open-ended research questions here about the roles and 
relationships here between the remote operator, the human occupant/s and the vehicle 
AI/HMI systems. Of course, remote operation introduces whole new categories of 
cyberattack, and specifically denial of service which can prevent a remote operator 
taking over in a timely manner, which may mean that it would be unfair to impose 
liability on the remote operator (or their insurer) for damage resulting from such attacks. 
Such implications may need to be considered if the definition is to be amended. 
38.  Agreed 
39.  Yes 
40.  Agreed 
41.  Agreed 
42.  Agreed and the accessibility advisory panel should meet at least once per year 
43.  No response 
44.  Agreed 
45.  No response 
46.  An ADSE should have an obligation of transparency similar to the obligations in the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 section 687 
47.  Agreed 
48.  Damage to external infrastructure can be covered by the offences of criminal damage 
 
49.  Agreed 
50.  Agreed 
51.  A person carrying out approved work will not have the intent to “interfere” with a 
vehicle. If greater clarity is required a defence should be included. 
52.  Agreed 
53.  Yes. The Motor Insurance Bureau Schemes that ensure compensation for victims of 
accidents caused by uninsured or untraced vehicles should be extended to cover AVs, or 
a scheme that provides equivalent cover should be put in place.  
 
54.  Yes. A review of the current product liability law should be undertaken to ensure that 
the regime is suited to accommodate emerging technologies such as AVs. However, such 
a review should not be confined to an exclusive examination of AVs; instead, it should 
aim to review the existing product liability law as a whole. Such a review should aim to 
examine areas of noted contention such as the definitions of defectiveness and product, 
to address the lacuna within the act which has yet to be fully addressed by the judiciary 
in the existing body of case law. 
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Whilst considerations of software in relation to the existing product liability regime are 
encouraged, as they are of great importance for both AVs and other emerging IOT 
technologies, it is important to note other aspects of the regime should also be 
examined. Elements such as section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987’s definition 
of defectiveness, which was intended when drafted to be enhanced and further defined 
through judicial dicta. However, some three decades later, Section 3’s definition remains 
to be ill-defined and continues to present challenges for claimants, defendants and the 
judiciary. 
Furthermore, challenges in proving causation under section 2 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987, especially those that may arise in cases involving AVs may also need 
to be examined. One type of issue that may present an insurmountable challenge for 
claimants (individual consumers or insurers) under section 2 when attempting to prove 
causation may arise in cases involving transitional level AVs (SAE level 1/2/3/4) are 
issues of causal uncertainty. Such issues are likely to arise due to the division of labour 
being shared between both the human driver and the AV's systems, especially where a 
harm is caused by an AV which is conducting parts of the driving process 'autonomously'. 
The presence of causal uncertainty paired with the inherent complexity of AVs may 
result in a scenario in which claimants may effectively be unable to prove causation. A 
scenario which may then have a knock-on effect on the development and adoption of 
AVs by consumers and insurers. 
55.  No response. 
 
56.  SAE level 2 and above AVs collect driver data but not identity. However, this could be 
inferred. Those who have access to this data could use it to infer usage patterns, in order 
to, for example, detect who’s driving and learn their daily routines. Therefore, disclosing 
data to insurers is to be done by consent (and we submit that it should be) it should be 
done with the users’ consent rather than the owners, as there may be many users but 
only one owner (and only one policy holder, who will presumably receive disclosure as 
required by GDPR article 13) of the vehicle. Data should be disclosed in machine 
readable form and should include metadata. 
57.  Whilst three years makes sense because of the limitation periods applicable to personal 
injury cases, it may mean that data will not be available in cases where (i) Claimants are 
below age 18 and therefore the limitation period does not begin to run until the 
Claimants 18th birthday; (ii) where the Claimant is under a disability for all or part of the 
three-year period (as noted under para 17.74). This could lead to some disadvantage for 
young people.  
58.  Agreed. In relation to (b) the ADSE should disclose any relevant Data Protection Impact 
Assessment as part of the approval process.  
 
